A novel containerization technique that satisfies Planetary Protection (PP) Category V requirements has been developed and demonstrated on the mock-up of the Mars Sample Return Container. The proposed approach uses explosive welding with a sacrificial layer and cut-through-the-seam techniques. The technology produces a container that is free from Martian contaminants on an atomic level. The containerization technique can be used on any celestial body that may support life. A major advantage of the proposed technology is the possibility of very fast (less than an hour) verification of both containment and cleanliness with typical metallurgical laboratory equipment. No separate biological verification is required. In addition to Category V requirements, the proposed container presents a surface that is clean from any, even nonviable organisms, and any molecular fragments of biological origin that are unique to Mars or any other celestial body other than Earth.
INTRODUCTION
The Mars Sample Return Mission will bring to Earth a sample that may contain a life-form of extraterrestrial origin. Requirements for such a mission are described in This document demands that the highest degree of concern is expressed by the need for stringent measures to prohibit unplanned impact with the Earth, the need for sterilization of returned hardware which directly contacted the target planet, and the need for containment of any unsterilized sample collected there and returned to Earth.
Currently, the only verifiable method of sterilization of an unknown life-form is heating the entire structure (or at least its outside layer) above 500ºC. Unfortunately, thermal soak may heat the sample inside the container to levels that are not compatible with the science requirements. Short of subjecting the whole container to some agent that is capable of breaking all carbon-carbon or carbon-nitrogen bonds, sterilization techniques for unknown life-forms are very hard to verify. Thus, an encapsulation and containment approach has been chosen in the described work to satisfy the Category V requirements. 1 This paper describes how encapsulation and containment requirements imposed on the Mars Sample Return mission can be accomplished and verified by using nonbiological techniques. The general approach chosen in this work can be formulated as the following sequence of steps:
1. Develop a set of requirements that permits nonbiological verification. These new requirements are stricter than the original PP requirements expressed in the biological requirement and guarantee that biological requirements are met. Concurrence of biochemists and planetary protection officers is essential to accomplish this task.
2. Develop a process that meets these stricter requirements.
3. Verify the compliance and design-in extremely high reliability.
The reliability estimates are based on meeting the stricter requirements. The latter allow the designers margins of errors because the actual Planetary Protection requirements are less restrictive. A case in which the strict requirements are not fulfilled but in which the original Planetary Protection requirements most probably are met is described later in the text.
CATEGORY V REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
Category V requirements are minimum requirements that are imposed on the spacecraft. We believe that the following requirements are stricter but relatively easy to verify. The proposed container design is based on the following definitions for containment and encapsulation requirements:
1. All life-forms are based on some chemical structures.
All molecules and chemical structures that
may be biologically active and have n o t been randomly generated on Earth by a natural process (e.g., lightning) are larger than some predetermined size. The magnitude of this size is much less important than the fact that the minimum size exists. We will assume that this size is larger than something very small, e.g., Kr, Xe, C O 2 , or NH 3 molecules. None of the biologists we talked to believe that structures that are the size of CO 2 and smaller may constitute life. In addition, all chemical compounds that are smaller than CO 2 have been generated on Earth by some random events.
3. The Earth does not need to be protected from chemicals and atomic structures that are already here. In other words, the containment enclosure must be impenetrable only to objects and chemicals that are either not found on Earth or have low probability of being found on Earth (anything less than one). have already adapted to the latter and, as such, do not pose any biological threat. 6. No surface on the outside of the container described in requirement 4, no matter how small, may have been contaminated with Mars artifacts that are larger than those described in requirements 2 and 3.
These conditions, while sufficient to satisfy Category V requirements, are much more restrictive. There are many large organic molecules that are either not biologically active or do not represent any biological threat. The outer walls of the proposed container will be free from all chemicals, even harmless chemicals, if they originated on Mars. We learned that these extended requirements are much easier to describe in terms that mechanical engineers can understand and verify. The base and speed of verification simplify the design process significantly.
All biologists, astrobiologists, and Planetary Protection practitioners we interviewed have agreed to requirements 1-3. Since there is no formal definition of life that can be tested experimentally (according to Dr. Kenneth H. Nealson of JPL), the survey of the astrobiologists and Planetary Protection practitioners was the only option open to us. The statement that life cannot be based on molecular structures smaller than CO 2 makes sense from a thermodynamic point of view: molecules that small cannot carry any information because they are purely quantum-mechanical objects. In addition, all atomic structures that small had been generated on Earth by random processes (e.g., lightning and volcanic eruption). Had the life-forms, whose chemical structure can be easily and frequently generated by random processes on Earth existed, these life-forms would have formed on Earth, and the defense against them would have been incorporated in the genes of Earth-based biological entities. Even if these objects happened to be very toxic, they could not trigger a large-scale event that would cause any significant damage to the Earth's ecosphere as a whole. Assumptions 1-3 are judged correct and will not be discussed further in this paper.
Requirement 5 describes a relatively leaky vacuum chamber or a pressure vessel. Engineers have known how to design those since the beginning of the century. State of the art ultrahigh vacuum (UHV) chambers satisfy much stricter sealing and leak requirements. Requirement 6, however, cannot be satisfied without development of a novel technology for the seam between the container and its lid. The design of this seam is the subject of the current paper. DOUBLE-WALLED CONTAINER AND SEAM. A sample return container with walls that have never been on Mars is surprisingly easy to design. If one covers the container on Earth with any material that constitutes a biobarrier and then removes the cover in space during the return flight, one has preserved the Category V compliant cleanliness of the container walls. Something as simple as aluminum foil or sheet metal constitutes a reliable biobarrier. Figure 1 describes the concept of a doublewalled container in detail. The volume between the walls of the container has been sealed on Earth and has never been exposed to Mars. When the container is closed and the outer walls removed, the internal container is clean everywhere, with the possible exception of the outermost edge of the seam. Verifiable cleanliness, sterility, and impenetrability of the seam between the two parts of the container (or the container and the lid) are crucial to Category V compliance. The Category V cleanliness of conventional seams cannot be easily verified. There is always a possibility that a small (<1 mm) particle with a live Martian life-form attached to it will find its way to the edge where the lid seam has been cut off from the outer biobarrier.
In the double container design described in figure 1 , the only point that can transfer the Martian contamination is the point at which the seam is severed (see fig. 1c ). The most obvious solution to this problem is to render a region within the seam sterile and separate the inner container from the outer wall by a cut through this sterilized region. The rendering can be accomplished in one of two ways: one can either sterilize the seam after it is established (1b), or one can clean the surfaces that form the seam during welding, to the degree that no life, as previously defined by assumption 2, can be present there (1a). The authors of this paper have chosen the latter approach. The joining is accomplished by explosively accelerating one (flyer) plate against a second (base) plate to achieve high-velocity (~1000 m/s) angular impact. At the impact point, the kinetic energy acquired by the flyer plate strips the outer layers of the (oxidized) metal on the surfaces of the plates (see fig. 2 ). The forces in the apex of the closing angle eject these layers to expose pure metals. Clean surfaces of the flyer and base plates are compressed together to such a degree that a metallic bond is established between the atoms within the plates through valence electron sharing. The value of the closing angle, the geometries of the flyer and base plates, and the impact velocity are critical parameters in the explosive welding. Explosive welding possesses several properties that are important for the PP compliant containerization:
1. The weld that is formed is based on a metallic bond; thus, the seam behaves like a bulk metal; i.e., it constitutes a biobarrier.
2. The weld is very tolerant of surface debris and thus has an extremely low probability of failure and a high tolerance of surface debris.
3. The surface cleaning is a mechanical process that does not use external tools that may be contaminated. The contaminants are stripped away by a very energetic process: the shear forces at the vertex point are well beyond the shear strength of the weld material. In addition, there are indications that the conditions at the vertex point may be capable of destroying any carbon-carbon based chemistry and thus performs verifiable sterilization of even unknown life (see footnote 2). The proposed encapsulation scheme, however, does not rely on this possible sterilization mechanism.
The main disadvantages of the explosive welding process, from a Planetary Protection point of view, are the small thickness of the stripped layer and the propensity of the bond to form interface waves that may prevent ejecta from completely leaving the bonded area and trap some surface particles within those waves. Both problems have been solved by the introduction of a sacrificial layer.
The sacrificial layer is of soft metal (we used aluminum) that is deposited on both the flyer and the base plates. During welding the total thickness of the layer is ejected from the surfaces. We were able to demonstrate that a sacrificial layer, with a total thickness of over 12 µm, can be stripped completely from the surfaces of the welded parts. A pure metallic bond is established between the parts that have been welded together. The wave formation was drastically decreased. An insignificant interfacial wave formation was limited to the areas removed from the breach in the seam and did not interfere with the sacrificial layer ejection in that area.
Expulsion demonstration experiments consisted of the following steps (see fig. 3 ):
1. The surface of the sacrificial layer was coated with a gold marker.
2. The explosive welding was performed with explosive ribbons on both sides of flyer and anvil plates, and multiple cross sections of the seam were obtained.
3. Expulsion of the aluminum layer was verified (e.g., by using scanning electron microscopy (SEM)); pure aluminum is easily distinguishable from the base metal even if the latter is an aluminum alloy.
4. The sample was analyzed for the presence of the gold marker. Full expulsion of the sacrificial layer guarantees Category V cleanliness of the stretch of metal within the created explosive welded seam. The sacrificial layer itself is a biobarrier that protects the metal below it. Thus, the metal surfaces that are underneath it are Category V clean (they did not have a chance to be exposed to the Martian environment). No molecular structures that were present at the surface of the sacrificial layer when the welded parts were apart will stay within the seam area after welding. We were able to demonstrate full expulsion of both aluminum and gold. This satisfies requirements 2 and 6 described above. Thus, the explosively welded seam can satisfy all the requirements for breaking the chain of contact described previously (see fig. 1a ).
Vacuum-tight sealing capabilities of the explosively welded seam are minimally affected by the presence of particulate surface debris. Joining tests (ref.
2) were conducted with a range of particles from talcum to silicon carbide. Vacuum-tight seals were achieved with surface debris levels as high as 20 mg/cm 2 . At these concentrations, the surface is nearly covered. The thickness of the dust layer is on the order of 0.3 mm. Neither submicron particles nor particles with sizes in excess of 50 µm prevented the seal from being vacuum tight at surface debris levels less than 10 mg/cm 2 .
SAMPLE CONTAINER DESIGN. The geometry of the double-walled container used in the demonstration is very similar to the one proposed for Mars Sample Return missions (see fig. 4 ). The container uses a concentric design that permits the use of only one ribbon of explosives (compare to fig. 2 ).
Contamination of the seam before welding may affect Category V compliance of the proposed design. All objects smaller than 10 µm will be expelled from the seam area and thus will not be present at the lip of the seam cutoff. At this point, to guarantee the Category V compliance by using requirements 1-6, all particles larger than 10 µm must be removed by some mechanical means before welding. Several techniques may be employed. Brushes or scrapers can remove large particles before the sealing sequence is initiated. A protective film can be placed on the seam and then removed just before welding to prevent large particles in the seam. Protection from surface debris is a wellestablished art in the engineering field.
The seam may meet Category V requirements even if the full expulsion of the particles within the sacrificial layer did not take place. A particle embedded in the seam that is not near the outmost tip of the seam after separation does not influence the Category V compliance. Only the particle embedded exactly at the tip of the cutoff may break the PP requirements. That point, however, is the The volume of the container between the walls is free from Martian contaminants. Surfaces that will be welded are covered with a sacrificial layer. During the explosion, the sacrificial layer is expulsed, the Category V clean surfaces that were covered by the sacrificial layer are welded to each other, and the weld is cut through (4c). As a result, the outside surface of the inner container has never been on Mars (4d); it has been exposed only to the inner surface of the outer container that is also free of Mars contamination.
point where explosive forces are at their strongest (see footnote 2 with the description of polyethylene film experiments). An investigation of the state of such a particle after explosion may remove the 10-µm particle size limit that guarantees verifiable compliance with Category V requirements A full-scale demonstration of an explosively welded sample return container has been performed. Figure 5 shows an aluminum container sealed by explosive welding next to the full-scale mock-up of the Mars Sample Return Container as it was envisioned in 1999. A detail of the welded inner container next to the welded outer container is presented in the same picture. In this demonstration, only the portion of the outer container that is close to the weld was used. The remaining part of the outer container should not influence the weld performance. The performance of the seal was optimized to increase the width of the area where the sacrificial layer is fully expulsed. The larger this area is, the less critical is the alignment of the container and the lid. A mosaic of SEM micrographs of a typical seam that was welded by a single-side explosion is reproduced in figure 6 . The SEM micrographs are taken in back-scattered electrons. The bright spots in the middle segment of figure 6c are the only remnants of gold marker in the seam. The verification protocol permits fast nonbiological testing of the device. Since the verification procedure is formalized and does not use any properties of extraterrestrial life, a meaningful assessment of containment reliability can be performed. A very large safety margin separates the proposed design from the minimum requirements of PP Category V. The container does not use any conditions specific to the Mars environment and can be used for sample return from any celestial body.
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